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Introduction
In focusing on the counterterrorist operations in Pakistan's Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA, this article takes issue with the notion 
Abstract
Despite years of wide-scale counterterrorism measures in Pakistan's 
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), the injection of substantial 
funds, and the "close" collaboration between the United States and Paki-
stan, the ugly truth is that the extremism and militancy in FATA contin-
ues to recruit members. Moreover, there is little indication that the killing 
of Usama bin Ladin will have any significant effect on reducing support 
for militancy. While taking stock of these realities, this article will not seek 
to rehash the many successes and failures of the counterterrorist opera-
tions in FATA. Instead, its purpose will be to argue that while the causes 
of, and recruitment into, militant organizations are complex, the litera-
ture has paid too little attention to the relationship between discourse, 
social consensus, and terrorism. Arguably, the accommodation of, and 
sympathy for, terrorist violence emerges from specific discourses that 
legitimize and normalize these actions. Consequently, part of the solution 
requires that policies consider the substance of popular perceptions, rep-
resentations, and discourses. In short, the article is concerned with direct-
ing attention away from a crisis-driven and short-term vision in FATA 
and moving toward acknowledging the value of long-term and sustainable 
peace.
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that an exclusively military focus can succeed in eliminating militancy 
and extremism. Its central thesis is that while nonmilitary methods 
encompassing a variety of development initiatives are necessary steps in 
the right direction, it is critically important to incorporate within these 
nonmilitary strategies attention to discourse as a causal factor in mili-
tancy. The article begins by offering a brief historical context of militancy 
in FATA and an evaluation of the ongoing counterterrorist operation. Fol-
lowing this background analysis, the argument considers conflict trans-
formation literature as an important reference point or framework within 
which long-term and sustainable peace may be envisioned. In focusing on 
transforming the dynamics of conflict, the article suggests that under-
standing discourse and representation as potential "platforms of change" 
and important parts of a multipronged, multidimensional nonmilitary 
strategy can have a substantial impact on reducing the accommodation 
and toleration of, and recruitment into, militancy.
The Cultivation of Militancy in FATA
Pakistan's Northwestern tribal belt, although nominally included in the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has had a peculiar semiautonomous status 
for much of its history. Following Pakistan's independence in 1947, it was 
agreed that the region would accede to Pakistan on the condition that it 
was granted a unique semiautonomous status. This autonomy translated 
into minimal central governance and administration. In particular, the 
notorious colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was maintained 
in FATA, which bestowed extensive executive, judicial, and revenue pow-
ers on a federally appointed Political Agent (PA). The concentration of 
power in the office of the Political Agent was instrumental in disenfran-
chising local populations and entrenching a system in which the PA, 
largely on the basis of patronage, selectively distributed development 
funds and resources. In the post-independence timeframe and in the 
absence of accountability, audit, and effective governance, FATA 
remained the least-developed region in Pakistan, with around sixty per-
cent of its residents living below the poverty line.1 In addition, lack of a 
state apparatus meant that tribal populations made and implemented 
their own laws and administration based on tribal codes and traditional 
institutions. As a result, FATA became akin to America's Wild West, in 
that all powers, including carrying out the law and meting out justice, 
resided at a local level.
The 1980s proved a decade of change for FATA. The expansion of Soviet 
influence in Afghanistan brought the adjoining FATA region into the 
international limelight. The United States, amid its Cold War with the 
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Soviet Union, took a renewed interest in the tribal belt. Its Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) joined forces with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelli-
gence Agency (ISI), along with Saudi donors, to fund, train, and arm 
FATA residents.2 Indeed, as has been well-documented, FATA's "Islamic 
soldiers," or mujahideen, were deliberately and consistently infused with 
a particular brand of violent jihadist fervor to incite a holy war against the 
expansion of Soviet communism in neighboring Afghanistan.3 As Paki-
stani scholar Tariq Amin-Khan has noted, this external funding and inter-
est in Islamisizing Pakistan's largely secular public realm was 
unprecedented.4 Subsequently, young men, imbued with religious pas-
sion, migrated to Pakistan from all over the world to fight and oust the 
Soviets from the region. Adding fuel to the fire, the CIA's funding of 
Islamic extremism in FATA coincided with General Muhammad Zia's rig-
orous policy to Islamisize the rest of Pakistani society by allowing, among 
other things, the mushroom-like growth of unregulated mudrassas, or 
religious schools.5
By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet threat had dissipated and FATA, hav-
ing served its strategic purpose, was no longer useful. These new realities 
prompted a hasty withdrawal of U.S. interest and funds from the region. 
As former President Pervez Musharraf notes, this was perhaps one of the 
most disastrous steps that could have been taken at the time. He argues: 
"We helped create the mujahideen, fired them with religious zeal in semi-
naries, armed them, paid them, fed them, and sent then to a jihad against 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We did not stop to think how we would 
divert them to productive life after the jihad was won."6
FATA's mujahideen, unfortunately, were forgotten until the devastating 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Suddenly, in the post-9/11 timeframe, 
FATA once again became the subject of intense international scrutiny. 
This time, however, Pakistan's tribal belt was viewed in an extremely neg-
ative light: as a hotbed of extremism, militancy, and, not least of all, the 
primary hideout of America's most wanted man, Usama bin Ladin. Con-
sequently, the inauguration of the U.S.-led War on Terror entailed a com-
bined U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorist effort to root out from FATA the 
Islamic militancy and extremism that had deliberately been cultivated 
during the 1980s. Without regulation and governance, Pakistan's tribal 
belt had been an easy target for the uninhibited flow of militant discourse 
and ideologies.7
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Evaluating Counterterrorism in FATA
Since commencement of the War on Terror, Pakistan's tribal belt has 
been infused with funds and subjected to a long military operation to root 
out militancy.8 This effort has resulted in some successes—for example, 
the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders—and has paved the way for 
the establishment of some government control over parts of FATA.9 
Indeed, Pakistan's military has gradually managed to gain control of large 
swaths of territory, thus reducing the space in which militants can oper-
ate. The cost of the military operation, however, has been devastatingly 
high in human terms. Official reports indicate that Pakistan's security 
forces have lost over 3,000 personnel and suffered many more injuries.10 
One may add to this cost, tens of thousands of people displaced from 
FATA and scores of civilian causalities resulting from CIA-led drone 
attacks.11
One of the chief features of the combined U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorist 
operations in FATA has been the way in which it has been crudely defined 
in terms of good and evil. This good-bad dichotomy, reminiscent of 
President Bush's "axis of evil" formulation, posits the War on Terror in 
terms of a simple conflict between civilization and barbarianism, sans any 
gray areas.12 Such a framing justifies and normalizes the "good" and 
employing military methods to physically eliminate the "bad." Moreover, 
and more critically, a simplistic good-versus-bad dichotomy requires little 
need to examine the social complexities and finer details of the problem. 
Indeed, popular conceptions of FATA's militancy are often implicitly 
embedded within the "new terrorism thesis" and a larger global jihad 
framework.13 This inhibits a deeper understanding of the militancy. A 
focus on global connections, for instance, and the tendency to 
simplistically assume all FATA groups are affiliates of al-Qaida, hinder 
seeing local events as perhaps related to structural violence or a lack of 
governance. By operating from this worldview, the bulk of U.S.-Pakistan 
counterterrorist operations has focused on identifying terrorist elements 
and their hosts and hideouts, then methodically eliminating them 
through firepower.
Despite its costs, however, the military campaign in FATA has—even at 
the best of times—provided only a precarious grip on the territories. The 
region continues to be susceptible to periodic outbursts of militancy.14 
Militant elements in FATA have attracted a seemingly endless supply of 
recruits, and there are alarming indications that extremism is spreading 
from FATA to Southern Punjab.15 Given this situation, it has become 
imperative to take stock and evaluate the extent to which the objectives of 
counterterrorist operations have been achieved, and to consider whether 
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an alternative approach might be more successful in eradicating militancy 
in FATA.
Conflict Transformation as an Alternative Approach
The peace studies field is notable for bringing a critical orientation to 
orthodox conceptualizations of conflict and peace, and a deeper reflection 
on the causes and drivers of conflict.16 Rather than viewing conflict sim-
ply in terms of good and bad, peace researchers focus on the quality of 
systemic relationships, so that conflict is seen as something caused, 
enabled, and reproduced by particular social structures and institutions. 
From this perspective, local and contextual factors are seen as the key to 
both sustaining and reproducing conflict in society.
While peace studies has many sub-fields and competing visions of "what 
matters," one area that has much to offer in terms of both understanding 
conflicts, as well as prescribing strategies to achieve long-term sustain-
able peace, is the sub-field of "conflict transformation."17 As its name sug-
gests, this approach focuses on changing conflict dynamics. It has three 
main components.
First, conflict transformation takes a holistic view of conflict in society, 
treating violence as an expression of the larger system of relationship 
patterns. Second, it shifts from focusing exclusively on resolving 
"presenting issues" and moves toward the much broader tasks of 
achieving reconciliation, restoring relationships, and sustaining peace. 
Third, it emphasizes building indigenous "cultures of peace," taking a 
bottom-up peace-building approach, as opposed to a top-down strategy 
that imposes peace through external military means. From the 
perspective of conflict transformation, top-down strategies provide only 
short-term peace.18
Scholar John Paul Lederach is perhaps one of the best-known proponents 
of the conflict transformation approach.19 He maintains that developing 
sustainable peace requires simultaneously engaging with three levels of 
leadership within society, illustrated in the pyramid below.20
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In the case of FATA, using Lederach's pyramid as a problem-solving 
framework would entail engaging with the region's middle-range leader-
ship, incorporating tribal elders, religious clerics, and formal and infor-
mal education providers. It would also involve eliciting clear commitment 
from, and genuine peacekeeping efforts by, top-level national and inter-
national leaders, Lederach also stresses engaging with communities and 
individuals to foster long-term sustainable conflict transformation, rather 
than merely managing or containing conflict through political settle-
ments. This approach recognizes the need not only to integrate efforts at 
all three tiers of society but to concentrate on engaging with society. 
Indeed, the pyramid's larger base indicates this focus.
Development initiatives in FATA, although ad hoc and often uncoordi-
nated, have been introduced.21 There is some indication that attention is 
being paid to alleviating poverty and unemployment, and dealing with 
disenfranchisement, illiteracy, and the lack of governance as well as socio-
economic marginalization.22 More recently, President Obama's Afghani-
stan-Pakistan (aka "Af-Pak") strategy has also begun recognizing, and 
engaging with, human and physical development issues.23 While atten-
tion to development initiatives and empowering local communities is 
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commendable and needs to be extended, an important aspect of the con-
flict has hitherto been largely neglected in terms of intervention.24 On this 
account, and in light of Lederach's ideas regarding the value of transform-
ing conflicts vis-à-vis containment, it is surprising that little attention has 
been paid to the role of discourse as a cause of militancy in FATA.
Viewing Militancy in FATA through the Discourse 
Lens
A large body of academic literature theorizes about, and empirically dem-
onstrates, the intimate links between popular discourse and concrete 
social practice. Some of this work concentrates on how representation 
regulates individual behavior, while a portion examines the enabling and 
constraining effects of strategic cultures and discursive frameworks on 
state-level decision making.25, 26 While there is much debate over the 
extent to which discourse and representation are more or less relevant 
than other explanatory factors, such as material power, there is neverthe-
less broad consensus that discourse—or the way in which we frame and 
interpret the world, as individuals and collectives—has a powerful effect 
on how we behave and respond. In a nutshell, we may say that human 
actions and practices are preceded by narratives, interpretations, or dis-
courses that enable or constrain the action under question. For many ana-
lysts, war and conflict are neither natural nor necessary, but essentially 
products of militarized discursive economies. Carolyn Nordstrom argues 
that violence in war is "a culture-bound system of learned rules, ethics, 
and actions (and) like all culture, these rules are made, enforced, rein-
forced, and changed through human interaction."27
In employing the same discourse lens to FATA, we are able to understand 
that what we witness today, in terms of the pockets of extremism and mil-
itancy, were actually preceded by a discourse, or language patterns, that 
accommodated the legitimacy of violence. For instance, the presence of 
foreign mujahideen in the territories for prolonged periods following the 
Cold War's end, as well as their introduction of radical forms of Islam into 
the region, was instrumental in normalizing a discourse that propagated a 
natural association between Islam, jihad, and violence. Encouraging an 
association between Islam and violent jihad had been acceptable during 
the Cold War. This representation, in the absence of a state apparatus and 
regulation, was left intact in the tribal region and allowed to grow and 
flourish. Thus, without central authority and credible educational institu-
tions, tribal populations were left amid confusing and mixed messages. 
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Moreover, widespread poverty and genuine political grievances com-
pounded frustration and drew recruits into radical groups that promised a 
better future (but ultimately failed to deliver).
If we acknowledge the powerful role of discourse in legitimizing and nor-
malizing behavior, it is possible to argue that the endemic militancy in 
FATA society indicates violent, exclusionist, and extremist discourses 
continue to have a foothold there. The accommodation, or at the very 
least the toleration, of militancy and extremism indicates that particular 
language structures are embedded in the society. Unless these underlying 
discourses become the focus of sustained policy intervention, military and 
nonmilitary measures in FATA likely will have limited long-term effects. 
In this region, however, inattention to the role of language may have 
resulted partly from the popularity of the "new terrorism thesis" that ter-
rorists are incorrigible. If militants are thought, at their very core, to be 
impervious to reason and negotiation, the use of force becomes the only 
available option.28
To this point, counterterrorist policy has lacked intervention at the level 
of popular discourse. In FATA, for instance, illegal radio broadcasts by 
groups allied with the banned terrorist organization Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) continued to spew extremist propaganda well into 2009 
and 2010.29 Pakistani authorities largely ignored the infamous broadcasts 
by Maulana Fazlullah, also known as "FM Mullah," that played a critical 
role in reproducing and legitimizing violence.30 Social space occupied by 
extremist discourses reproduces, accommodates, legitimizes, and assists 
recruitment into militancy. Thus, while building basic infrastructure, 
reducing poverty, and physically eliminating terrorist outfits are 
important goals, it is equally—if not more—important, as a first step, to 
focus on discourse as a causal variable facilitating militancy. In a culture 
of toleration, it is difficult to see how other grassroots measures can be 
successful.31
Discourse Intervention: A Platform of Change?
The significance of discourse becomes apparent only within critically ori-
entated approaches to problem-solving that, on the one hand, focus on a 
more complex and holistic understanding of militancy in FATA and, on 
the other, avoid a priori assumptions based on a dichotomous civilisa-
tional/barbarian narrative.32 A better approach would be to understand 
how discourses and ideology played a historical role in producing mili-
tancy in the first place, and, how they continue to play a role in reproduc-
ing and sustaining militant practices. If violent conflict and militancy are 
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partly social products that reflect a public space dominated by exclusion-
ist and hegemonic discourse, a long-term and sustainable solution for 
FATA requires, besides wider socioeconomic uplift, an emphasis on alter-
ing the ideological environment and focusing on embedding transforma-
tive counterdiscourses.33
In FATA, traditional Islamic and indigenous cultural practices provide 
ample resources that run counter to militant extremist worldviews. More-
over, policy should consider Lederach's conflict transformation prescrip-
tion of engaging genuinely and intensively at the grassroots level—of 
transforming conflicts in ways that give rise to a sustainable and long-
term peaceful society, as opposed to simply managing or containing con-
flict. Lederach's insistence on using indigenous resources to initiate trans-
formation provides a useful generic framework and vision, within which 
the attention to discourse can be embedded. This vision of change and 
transformation is something that must come from within communities, as 
opposed to something imposed from outside, has important implications 
for policy and practice.
The purpose here is not to suggest that a wide-scale discourse interven-
tion strategy is the solution. Rather, the argument put forward is that an 
attention to the productive role of language and discourse as a causal fac-
tor in FATA's militancy must form an essential part of an overall nonmili-
tary strategy. While military intervention is important in the sense that it 
provides for physical security, it must nevertheless co-exist and work 
alongside strategies and interventions that focus on a multiplicity of 
causal factors.
Conclusion
The notion of the incorrigible militant underpinning the War on Terror 
has led to counterterrorist strategies focused on identifying and physically 
eliminating terrorists. While the purpose here has not been to criticize 
such methods, this article has nevertheless sought to critically question 
the extent to which such strategies can reach their objectives. In FATA, for 
instance, an evaluation of counterterrorist operations reveals the 
limitations of a "firefighting" approach that seeks to temporarily 
extinguish the visible problem without addressing the underlying factors 
sustaining militancy.
In seeking to offer a different problem-solving perspective, this article 
suggests a need to move away from viewing FATA's militancy through a 
constraining global-jihad prism. Instead, in drawing on the conflict trans-
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formation literature, the article argues for a more intensive understand-
ing of the local contexts, dynamics, and drivers of militancy. A framework 
that focuses on transformation as a precursor to sustainable peace draws 
attention to, among other things, the productive role of discourse and rep-
resentation in facilitating violence and militancy.
In FATA, as part of a nonmilitary approach focused on democratization, 
national integration, and development activities, it is critical to address 
embedded perceptions that allow the recruitment, hospitality, and 
accommodation of militants. Indeed, a credible and indigenous discourse 
intervention strategy must be put into place, as a military strategy alone is 
unlikely to eliminate militancy in FATA. In terms of a viable counterter-
rorism policy, this translates into the need for a wide-scale, deliberate, 
well-thought-out strategy to counter extremist discourse. If counterter-
rorism policy aims to achieve a sustainable peace, then rather than being 
a minor add-on to existing nonmilitary strategy, discourse intervention 
must be a central and important part of the counterterrorism plan in 
FATA.
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